The Federal Securities Code and its Effects on Existing United States Securities Regulation by Cheek, James H., III & Hawes, Douglas W.
Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 2 (1979) 245-259
Q North-Holland Publishing Company
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND ITS EFFECTS ON EXISTING
UNITED STATES SECURITIES REGULATION
JAMES H. CHEEK, III * and DOUGLAS W. HAWES **
The proposed Federal Securities Code [1] is the extraordinary result often years
of careful analysis and debate by the American Law Institute, the American Bar
Association, and the Reporter for the Code, Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard
Law School. It is a consolidation and simplification of six separate federal securities
statutes [21, and is therefore the realization of a dream for lawyers, scholars and
others who have worked with the federal securities laws and wished for a time when
the acts might be simplified and integrated into one statute [3]. Whether or not the
proposed legislation is in fact adopted, the quality of the work underlying it merits
careful consideration of its treatment of the regulation of securities in the United
States. This article discusses the need for, the movement toward, and the process of
codification. Thereafter, it describes the structure of the Code and some of the
important changes the Code would effect in the law. Finally, it examines the extra-
territorial application of the Code.
1. Introduction
1.1. The need for codification
The legislative reaction to abuses in the purchase and sale of securities during
the 1920s produced, between 1933 and 1940, six federal statutes regulating various
aspects of securities transactions and the securities markets. On the whole, these
laws have worked well. However, as is perhaps inevitable during a period of legis-
lative revolution, inexplicable inconsistencies have been found to exist between
comparable provisions of these various laws. Such inconsistencies have led to some
confusion both among members of the bar and the judiciary. Consequently, there
has gradually developed considerable support for the codification of these laws into
a single piece of legislation, the effect of which would be to eliminate existing over-
laps and inconsistencies and to reexamine the entire scheme of investor protection
with a view toward improving efficiency of regulation.
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1.2. The movement toward codification
The idea of codification has a lengthy history. However, no action was taken to
begin a codification project until 1966 when, following publication of Milton
Cohen's landmark article, "Truth in Securities" Revisited [4], the American Bar
Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities held a two-day confe-
rence on codification. At that conference it was evident that there was a strong
desire for the codification effort to begin in earnest [5]. By 1969 the effort was
undertaken under the auspices of the American Law Institute.
1.3. The codification process
The proposed official draft of the Federal Securities Code, approved by the
American Law Institute in May 1978 and by the American Bar Association in
February 1979, is the product of six tentative drafts, each of which was reviewed
and approved by the American Law Institute and each of which was the subject of
a significant number of proposed tentative drafts which were analyzed and com-
mented upon by many individual experts in the field of securities law. The Re-
porter of the project, Professor Louis Loss, was assisted primarily by three groups
of advisers: (a) a small group of consultants; (b) a larger group of advisers, including
seven former SEC commissioners and distinguished members of the judiciary, aca-
demia and the bar; and (c) the American Bar Association's Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, which consists of approximately 300 lawyers whose pro-
fessional interests lie primarily in the area of securities law [6]. In addition, the
Reporter consulted with a number of persons who had particular expertise and
interest in certain technical parts of the Code and with various staff members of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and of the appropriate congressional subcom-
mittees.
Enormous time and expense have been invested into the drafting process. This
can be appreciated from the fact that the American Law Institute spent over
S 450,000 in connection with the drafting process and that the estimated dollar
value of the time contributed by private practitioners who participated in the pro-
ject represents an amount in excess of S 3,000,000 [7].
In spite of the fact that few pieces of proposed legislation will come to the
United States Congress with as much expert work behind them as the proposed
Federal Securities Code, and despite the endorsement of the American Law Insti-
tute and the American Bar Association, the proposed official draft of the Federal
Securities Code is not assured of being enacted into law. Support of the Securities
and Exchange Commission is critical and strong opposition by the Commission
would seriously if not totally undermine any hope of the Code being officially
enacted into law. The Commission's staff has conducted an intensive and critical
review of the Code and the Corrmission itself is presently formulating its official
position on the Code. It is highly likely that the Commission's views on the Code
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will result in some significant changes and compromises in various parts. Also, many
interest groups will try to get one or another part changed. Congress will try to
accommodate these suggestions as it considers the Code.
Even though the Code is neither in its final form nor yet enacted into law, it has
exerted considerable influence on concerned members of the United States legal
community. Numerous commentators have studied and discussed various portions
of the Code [8].
Most of the published commentary on the Code to date has been concerned pri-
marily with describing the differences between the Code and existing law and with
suggesting technical changes in the Draft. However, there has been criticism [9] and
at least one broad-based attack on the Code from a private practitioner who con-
tends that:
[F]irst, the Code grants too much power to the Securities and Exchange Commission to formu-
late, interpret, and enforce the federal securities laws; second, several of the provisions expand-
ing plaintiffs' rights will create additional litigation without a commensurate improvement in
investor protection; and third, enactment of the Code is not essential to the solution of existing
problems in the federal securities area [10].
The Code, in its numerous drafts, has also been referred to in at least 38 differ-
ent judicial decisions [11]. Thus, while the prospects for having the Code imme-
diately enacted into law maybe dim, the Code does serve, at the present time, as both
a model and a research tool in the area of securities law.
2. Structure and changes
2.1. Structure of the proposed Federal Securities Code
The proposed Federal Securities Code has three objectives:
(1) simplification of an inevitably complex body of law in the light of some four decades of
administration and litigation;
(2) elimination (so far as possible) of duplicate regulation; and
(3) reexamination of the entire scheme of investor protection with a view to increasing its
efficiency and doing so, in President Roosevelt's words, "with the least possible inter-
ference to honest business" [footnote omitted] [121.
In order to achieve these goals, the Code is organized into twenty parts, each of
which is designed to cover a specific subject area. Two of these parts play a critical
role in eliminating the overlaps and inconsistencies which exist in the present law.
The first, entitled "Definitions", unifies definitions applicable to all the compo-
nents of the Code; the second, entitled "Exemptions", sets forth a single set of
Code-wide exemptions from the Code's registration requirement. The diverse sub-
jects covered by the other parts of the Code relate to such matters as issuer registra-
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tion; distributions; post-registration provisions; broker, dealer and investment
adviser registration and qualifications; self-regulatory organizations; market regula-
tion; national market and clearance settlement systems; municipal securities;
broker-dealer insolvency; trust indentures; investment companies; utility holding
companies; fraud, misrepresentation and manipulation; civil liability; and adminis-
tration and enforcement.
In accordance with the notion that the principal motivating force behind the
drafting effort is the codification of existing law, the fundamental concepts under-
lying the existing statutes have, for the most part, been retained. Nevertheless, the
Code does contain a number of substantive changes, particularly in the areas of dis-
closure, fraud, and civil liability. These changes are necessary in order to improve
regulation efficiency within the confines of basically unchanged fundamental con-
cepts. In this brief article, it is impossible to summarize all of the changes; however,
the authors will discuss the most significant areas of change.
2.2. Significant areas of change
2.2.1. Disclosure
The disclosure philosophy is based upon the principle that investors must be
given an accurate and complete rendition of all facts material to the making of
informed decisions concerning purchase, sale, or retention of securities. It is em-
bodied in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) [13] and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) [14], and is maintained by the Code as well. However,
implementation of the philosophy differs as between the current law and the Code.
Pursuant to existing law in most cases a company must file a new registration
statement under the 1933 Act whenever a new public offering of its securities is
made. The registration statement must contain a prospectus, a document designed
to disclose all material facts; and the prospectus must be delivered to each investor
prior to, or simultaneously with, the confirmation. Under the Federal Securities
Code, registration of securities is replaced by registration of companies. That is to
say, under the Code a company must register as such "after the first fiscal year-end
at which it has at least $ 1,000,000 of total assets and five hundred holders of its
securities" [15] or when the first "distribution" is made of any of its securities
[16]. The registration statement must contain "whatever information, financial
statements, material contracts, and other documents the Comnimission specifies by
rule" [17]. Therefore, under the Code, unlike under existing law which sets forth
general areas of information that can be required to be disclosed, the Commission
has considerable discretion in determining what information is required to be
included in the registration statement. It is unlikely that any of the requirements of
the 1933 registration statement would be simplified under the Code, however.
As a result of the Code's scheme of company, rather than, security issue, registra-
tion, the Code replaces the 1933 Act registration statement with an "offering state-
ment". This must contain "a prospectus together with whatever information, fiman-
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cial statements, material contracts, and other documents the Commission specifies
by rule" [18] and it must be filed for each nonexempt "distribution" of securities
by any person. No distinctions are made between primary distributions by an issuer
and secondary distributions by controlling or noncontrolling persons. Conse-
quently, the definition of "distribution" [19] and the content of various exemp-
tions are critical to an understanding of the Code's disclosure provisions.
The Code's one-time registration of companies is permanent and followed by
continuous disclosure on a current basis, similar to that of the 1934 Act. Under
this scheme, each company has only one file and all reports, documents, and filings
are placed into the same file. Emphasis on this one-time, permanent registration of
companies is so fundamental to the Code's regulatory scheme that significant
advantages are granted to companies that have been "continuously a registrant for
one year" [20]. Such a company is relieved from the requirement to prepare, file
and distribute extensive offering statements on the theory that by virtue of its
registration under the Code, there is already sufficient information available to the
public to enable investors to make informed decisions concerning that company's
securities. Also, when the security of a company that is not a one-year registrant
has been sold, the purchaser may repudiate the transaction by delivering a notice of
disaffirmance to the seller's business address not later than the second full business
day after the buyer's receipt of a prospectus and notice of his right to disaffirm the
purchase [21]. This disaffirmance privilege aims to resolve the situation that arises
under the 1933 Act in which a buyer frequently commits himself to purchasing a
security before he ever has an opportunity to review the prospectus.
2.2.2. Exemptions
(1) Issuer sales of securities. The Federal Securities Code provides issuers with
several exemptions from the offering statement requirement. Theoretically, the
Code maintains the principal exemptions existing under the 1933 Act. However, in
order to avoid the numerous interpretive problems that arise under the 1933 Act,
the Code modifies some of these exemptions. For instance, the private placement
exemption [22]. is clarified and referred to as a "limited offering". Under this
exemption there is no limit on the number of permitted offerees, and sales may be
made to any number of institutional investors and/or to no more than thirty-five
other persons [23]. Purchasers need not be sophisticated, wealthy, or closely
related to the issuer; nor do they have to have access to or be furnished with offer-
ing statement information. Unrestrained active solicitation of prospective pur-
chasers is controlled by a prohibition against "general advertising" in contravention
of SEC rules but this prohibition is not framed as a condition for having a valid
"limited offering" [24]. Resales of securities acquired in a limited offering are not
subject to a specific holding period, per se, but may not result in more than thirty-
five noninstitutional buyer-owners at any one time during a restricted selling
period. A restricted selling period for a one-year registrant is one year; the period
for a non one-year registrant is three years. In spite of all these modifications in the
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exemption, the Code does leave open the possibility of uncertainty in that it
authorizes the Commission to add to, or modify, the conditions for a "limited
offering" when the issuer is not a one-year registrant. On the whole, however, the
Code solves most of the difficulties that arise under the existing private placement
exemption.
The intrastate offering exemption of the 1933 Act [25) is another exemption
maintained in modified form in the Code. However, the Code materially changes
the substantive parts of that exemption. The Codes concept is that of "local distri-
bution" and requires that sales must be "substantially restricted" to residents or
persons with primary employment in a single state or in an area in contiguous states
or a state and a contiguous foreign country as defined by Commission rule [26]. Un-
likie existing law, offers to nonresidents do not destroy the exemption; sales to
some nonresidents are permitted; and the problem of selling in a densely populated
metropolitan area covering several states may be resolved by Commission rule.
Furthermore, unlike existing law the issuer is not required to be incorporated in the
state of the offering. Such improvements are needed and will be welcomed by most
securities practitioners.
A review of the limited offering and intrastate offering exemption indicates a
clear intention to resolve present uncertainties in the exempt transaction area by
creating an objective set of requirements that expand the opportunities to avoid the
offering statement requirement, particularly if a company is a one-year registrant.
The Code contains several other exemptions for transactions and securities [27];
for the most part, these are continuations of the exemptions presently available
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Unlike the 1933 Act, however, the Code provides
plenary authority for the Commission to exempt, by rule or order, any person,
security or transaction, retroactively or prospectively, from all or any of the provi-
sions of the Code, subject to a very few narrow exceptions [28]. This exemptive
authority parallels that Which presently exists in the 1933 Act but is not restricted
either by dollar amount or type of issuer. In addition, the Code contains a specific
exemption not found in the present law for all offerings of not more than
$ 100,000 [29]. The net effect of the Code's exemption scheme (including the
liberalized concepts of today's private placement and intrastate exemptions) is
likely to improve the ability of issuers to raise capital without having to bear the
costs and other burdens of the registration process.
(2) Secondary sales of securities. Sales of securities by persons other than issuers
also must comply with the registration requirements of the Code or be exempted
therefrom. This approach differs from that of existing law which presuppoges a
registration statement requirement only for sales that are transacted by a control-
ling person of an issuer [30]. However, the Code provides a number of exceptions
and exemptions pursuant to which secondary sellers can sell without being con-
cerned with the offering statement requirements of the Code. In addition to the
exemptions available to issuers, secondary sellers under the Code may rely upon
two exemptions that are unavailable to issuers. First, the Code contains a "trading
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transaction" exception to its definition of distribution [31], which is a successor
provision to the present Rule 144 [32] promulgated under the 1933 Act. A
"trading transaction" must be made "through a broker or with or by a dealer" who
performs no more than his usual function and receives no usual compensation.
There is, however, no specific prohibition against solicitation as there is at present
under Rule 144. There is likely to be a restriction on volume in a trading trans-
action, biut the exact limitations are left to Commission rule, in part because of the
rapid evolution of the securities markets.
The second and probably the most open exemption available only for secondary
sales is that provided for "secondary distributions" [33]. This provision, designed
to facilitate block trades, exempts any resales by a secondary seller of securities
issued by a one-year registrant if the seller does not own more than 15 percent of
the voting securities of that registrant. It is an unconditional exemption, non-
existent in the present law, and it permits a seller to pay a broker unusual compen-
sation or to engage in unusual solicitation in order to effectuate the sale.
Since all nonexempt distributions must be made in compliance with the Code's
offering statement requirements, the Code, unlike existing law, provides a means by
which secondary sellers can register or force the registration of their securities offer-
ings. If the issuer is a one-year registrant, a secondary seller may file a very simple
"distribution statement" containing information about the seller and the distribu-
tion [341. If the issuer is not a one-year registrant, then the Code allows a second-
ary seller to demand that the issuer file an offering statement subject to some very
complex and carefully drafted restrictions designed to ensure that the demand regis-
tration process is not abused [35].
2.2.3. Fraud and civil liability
The Code makes substantial changes in the area of fraud and civil liabilities.
Today's problems in the area are caused by the superficial and inconsistent manner
in which the various existing statutes treat fraud and civil liabilities, and the result-
ing efforts of the courts to devise a balanced set of antifraud principles and reme-
dies. There has developed a large melting pot ofjudge-made law clustered primarily
around the judicially implied remedies provided for by Rule lOb-5, promulgated
under the 1934 Act. This body of law, when considered in connection with the
express liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, has created tremendous con-
fusion and uncertainty in the area. The Code brings some order and logic to the
area by collecting in one part [36] all of the prohibitions against fraudulent and
manipulative conduct which are haphazardly scattered throughout the existing
securities laws, and by collecting in another part [37] all the provisions providing
for civil liability. In these parts the Code clarifies the elements of the available
causes of action; defines the role of reliance, causation and privity; establishes a
consistent statute of limitations; clarifies standing to sue; establishes measures of
damages; and carefully delineates the standards of care applicable to the various
kinds of conduct.
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Generally, the Code proibits "fraudulent acts" or "misrepresentations" in con-
nection with such activities as purchases and sales of securities, proxy solicitations,
tender 6ffers, investment advice, and a company's filings, records and publicity.
"Fraudulent act" is defined very broadly [38] and provides the elasticity that is
necessary for judicial and administrative flexibility in applying the prohibitions con-
tained in the Code to new imaginative fraudulent schemes. The Code also imposes
a limited duty to correct a misrepresentation [39], an affirmative obligation on
insiders (including tippees) to disclose material facts when they trade [40], and spe-
cific prohibitions against churning, touting, fictitious quotations, manipulation and
stabilization [41].
The Code's scheme of civil liabilities codifies, with some reforms, most of the
existing express liability provisions, as well as most of the judicially implied liabili-
ties. The uniformity and clarity of the Codes approach is weakened only by spe-
cific recognition of a court's power to create a private action based upon a violation
of the Code even though such right is not expressly created by the Code [42]. The
Code contains four subparts related to civil liabilities: one concerns sales and pur-
chases of securities that violate the nonfraud provisions of the Code, such as its
offering or registration statement filing requirements; another deals with sales and
purchases that violate its antifraud prohibitions; another covers false and misleading
registration statements, other filings and publications; and tlhe last subpart deals
with such areas as manipulation and stabilization, failure to register on demand,
proxy solicitations, acquisitions and tender offers, short-term insider trading, un-
lawfl trading and advisory practices, credit provisions, churning, and breach of cer-
tain fiduciary duties. Each of these provisions to some extent reflects a rethinking
and a reworking of currently existing statutory and judicial law and lore, including
that which concerns the elements of claims and the available remedies. Some of the
more significant reforms in these areas are as follows.
1. Unlike existing law, the Code establishes monetary limits for some actionable
conduct other than knowing misconduct. Where a defendant did not engage in a
direct transaction with the plaintiff and did not act with knowledge, monetary
damages for that defendant are limited generally to the greatest of $ 100,000,
1 percent of the defendant's gross revenues received during the last fiscal year before
the filing of the action (to a maximum of $ 1,000,000), or the defendant's profit
[43]. As a result of this damages limitation, the huge dollar risk arising from civil
liability for negligent conduct in market transactions, which exists under present
law, is-Aiininmized.
2. Under existing law, certain officers, directors, accountants and underwriters
can be held liable for damages for a registration statement containing false and mis-
leading statements of material fact if such persons have been found to be negligent.
In the original text of the proposed official draft adopted by the American Law
Institute, such persons would be subject to liability for failure to exercise reason-
able care in connection with the annual report required by the Code to be filed
with the Commission [44]. As a result of significant opposition to that concept
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[45], the Code was amended at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute
in May 1979 so that the Code does not now take a position with respect to the im-
position of such a liability on these persons. In other words, the Code leaves it to
Congress to decide what to do.
3. For the most part, the Code eliminates reliance as an element of the plaintiff's
burden of proof.
4. For the most part, the Code also eliminates transactional causation as an ele-
ment of the plaintiffs burden of proof. However, a defendant may reduce damages
in some instances by proving that the plaintiff's losses were not caused by the viola-
tion.
5. The Code clarifies the fact that aiders and abettors of fraudulent conduct may
be found liable.
6. The Code eliminates almost all of the privity limitations presently found in
the 1933 Act.
2.3. Other areas of significant change
While the reforms relating to the disclosure and civil liability parts of the Code
are clearly those that will have the greatest impact upon existing law, the Code does
make other, important changes in the law. For example, there is at present a signifi-
cant amount of overlap between federal and state regulation of securities. The Code
employs an innovative means to coordinate federal and state securities regulation
and virtually eliminates the authority of states to impose disclosure requirements in
addition to those required by federal law [46]. Under the Code, states are in fact
prohibited from regulating the distribution of certain specified high quality securi-
ties and will have only very limited authority in the area of tender offers. This
meshing of federal and state regulatory schemes has been approved by the principal
organization of state securities administrators and represents a major step toward
eliminating senseless overlap in this area.
With respect to market regulation, the Code in large part simply integrates, rear-
ranges and clarifies the 1975 amendments to the federal securities laws, making
very few substantive changes. The Code does provide a single registration proce-
dure for brokers, dealers, municipal broker-dealers and investment advisers as well
as a single scheme of administrative discipline, thereby simplifying present law and
codifying some of the existing fiduciary concepts, such as the "shingle theory".
Furthermore, unlike existing law, the Code subjects investment advisers to qualifi-
cation and financial responsibility requirements and their regulation is much tighter
in almost all respects [47]. Separate parts of the Code are designed to handle all
matters related to the self-regulatory organizations such as the exchanges, the
NASD, the clearing agencies and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, there-
by again eliminating much unnecessary duplication.
Except in certain limited respects, the Code does not alter the basic regulatory
schemes of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 [481, the Investment Company Act of
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1940 [49], and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 [50]. The most
significant changes in the Trust Indenture Act center around the inclusion of the
concept of the mandatory and optional indenture provisions found in the Ameri-
can Bar Fbundation's Model Debenture Indentures. The Code permits the incor-
poration of these provisions by reference, rendering it unnecessary to set them
forth in the actual indenture [51]. Uniform construction of these provisions is
solved through the provision that the statutory and optional provisions are to be
interpreted, applied, and enforced exclusively as a matter of federal law, thus pre-
empting state law. The Investment Company Act is not revised substantially by the
Code, in part because of the difficulty of reaching a consensus on some important
questions. Several important problems under that Act are nevertheless resolved. For
example, mini-accounts, which create Investment Company Act problems under
existing law, are excluded from the definition of investment companies and are
treated through the Code's regulation of investment advisers; the "inadvertent
investment company" problem is helped through a looser and more realistic defini-
tion of investment company, designed to exclude enterprises not intending to be
the traditional investment company [52]. With respect to the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935, the principal changes are evident in the exemption area
where the statutory language has been modified to conform to hoary administra-
tive interpretation [53].
The proposed administrative and enforcement scheme under the Code is vast in
its application and effect, particularly for those involved in enforcement matters
[54]. The powers of the Commission with respect to administration and enforce-
ment matters are a controversial aspect of the Code. The Commission and its staff
feel that their powers are not sufficiently broad while certain members of the bar
actively engaged in enforcement -matters believe that the Code's changes serve to
provide the Commission with too great an opportunity to exercise and abuse its
authority. This controversy will ultimately be decided in the halls of Congress.
3. The extraterritorial reach of the Code [55]
The existing statutory treatment of the extraterritorial application of the federal
securities laws has long been recognized as inadequate [56]. Accordingly, the
drafters of the Code undertook to devise a comprehensive provision setting forth a
general set of principles to indicate the extent to which any part of the Code
applies extraterritorially. This provision [57] applies with respect to various classifi-
cations of transactions, conduct and status rather than with respect to particular
sections of the Code. While the extraterritorial applications are confined "[w]ithin
the limits of international law" [58] they are designed to be substantively broad. It
is left to Commission rulemaking authority to tailor the expression of power in the
international law sense to the appropriate policy considerations of the Code.
First, the Code covers all purchases and sales of securities, proxy solicitations,
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tender offers and activities of investment advisers that occur (in each case) within
the United States, even if initiated outside the United States [59]. Thus, if a French
company were to offer securities in the United States or if an English company
were to invite tenders by the American shareholders of a Canadian company, or if a
Swiss investment adviser were to recommend to a United States resident a Japanese
security traded only abroad, the Code would apply.
Second, the Code applies to nonresidents who register as issuers, brokers or
investment advisers [60]. However, foreign brokers, for example, need not register
if they do business only with persons situated outside the United States or with
existing clients who are not United States citizens and are present only temporarily
in the United States [61].
Third, all conduct other than that mentioned in the first part above "whose
constituent elements occur to a substantial (but not necessarily predominant)
extent within the United States" or "some or all of whose constituent elements
occur outside the United States but cause a substantial [Code violating] effect
within [the United States]" is also covered [62].
Fourth, other subsections treat the observe problem, i.e. conduct that is initiated
within the United States but occurs outside the United States [63]; that is to say,
with respect to registration, proxy solicitation, tender offers and investment advice,
only the antifraud provisions apply. Thus, a registration statement prepared in the
United States for use abroad (for example, a Eurobond offering) would not have
to comply with the registration provisions of the Code but would be subject to the
antifraud rules.
Finally, the Commission is given extremely broad authority, within specified lim-
itations, to contract the areas covered or to expand, or increase the subject matter
that is covered by the extraterritorial application provisions [64].
The prima facie breadth of the extraterritoriality provision will no doubt con-
cern or even alarm non-Americans although the limitation of "within the limits of
international law"'-is expressly stated. However, the Code provision is a clear im-
provement over the sketchy treatment of the subject under existing statutes, builds
on the substantial body of case law in recent years [65] and provides for further
tailoring of the coverage by Commission rule.
4. Conclusion
The Code sets forth a grand scheme of regulation for securities-related matters.
Yet the many differing interests affected by such a scheme inevitably make passage
of such legislation a matter of compromise. The effort to accommodate to the
Securities and Exchange Commission's objections to the Code is ongoing and will
undoubtedly result in a modified version of the Code being considered by Congress
in its hearings. The hearing process will be a lengthy.one and it is unlikely that the
Code will be enacted during the next three to five years. Nevertheless, the Code will
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have immediate and substantial importance, both as a research tool and as encour-
agement to the Commission to effect substantive changes in its policies and proce-
dures under the existing federal securities laws. The Code can be and should be con-
sidered a success for these reasons alone.
Notes
(1] ALL Fed. See. Code Proposed Official Draft (March 15, 1978), as amended by Supple-
ment No. 1 dated May 17, 1979 [hereinafter cited as POD or the Code]. Some changes in the
ALI Code will appear in the proposed legislation as a result of comments by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, subsequent legislation, and the correction of nonsubstantive technical
errors. Copies of the POD and the official draft are available from the American Law Institute,
4025 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA. 19104.
The authors wish to alert the reader to publication of the official draft of the Code in May
1980. It contains a section-by-section commentary by Professor Loss and constitutes the best
textbook on the federal securities laws since Professor Loss's three-volume treatise entitled
Securities Regulation.
[2] Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976) [hereinafter the 1933 Act]; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976) [hereinafter the 1934 Act]; Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935,15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aaa (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976); Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1976).
(3] One of the early suggestions that the various securities laws should be treated as a single
whole appears in the 1951 edition of Professor Loss's treatise on securities. In describing the
then six separate statutes regulating various securities matters, Professor Loss urged that these
different acts should be treated "as a single piece of legislation ... which is what ideally they
should be". Loss, Securities Regulation at vi (1st ed. 1951). For a history of thought regarding
codification which goes back to 1940,'see Loss, The American Law Institutes Federal Securi-
ties Code Project, 25 Bus. Law. 27 (1969) at 29.
[4] Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340 (1966).
[5 ] For a summary of the views expressed at the ABA conference, see Conference on Codifi-
cation of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793 (1967).
[6] The authors are members of this Committee.
[7] None of the project participants actually received any compensation.
[8] For an extensive symposium on the Code, see Symposium: American Law Institute's
Proposed Federal securities Code, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 311 (1977); Bartell, Federal-State Rela-
tions under the Federal Securities Code, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 457 (1979). See also Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities, ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code, 34 Bus. Law. 345
(Nov. 1978).
[9] See, e.g., Kripke, Securities Law Reform and the Federal Securities Code, 33 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1453 (1979); and Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the SecuritiesActs and
the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. Miami L. Rev. 1471 (1979).
[10] Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 Vir. L. Rev.
615 (1979) at 616.
[11] TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Foremost-McKesson,
Inc. V. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975); Fidenas, AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique, CII
Honeywell Bull, S.A., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,947 (2d Cir. 1979);
Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Srhith, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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Rep. (CCH) 96,931 (4th Cir. 1979); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc., 598
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball and Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir.
1979); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir.
1979); United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978);Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Common-
wealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978); Goldberg v. Meridor, S67 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1977); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977); Fridrich
v. Bradford [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,723 (4th Cir., Sept.
15, 1976); Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross and Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir.
1976); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976); Straub v. Vaisman and Company,
Inc., 540 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976);
Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Harris v. American Investment
Company, 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Incorporated, 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1975); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G&G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.
1975); American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974); National Nutri-
tional Foods Association v. Food and Drug Administration, 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Company, 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); United California Bank v.
Salik, 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Franchard Corporation, 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.
1973); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Manufacturing Corporation, 476 F. 2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973);Elkind v.
Liggett and Myers, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,908 (S.D.N.Y.,
1979); Brascan Limited v. Edper Equities, Ltd., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,882 (S.D.N.Y., 1979); Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F.Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y., 1979);
Hendrickson v. Buchbinder, 465 F.Supp. 1250 (S.D. Fla., 1979);Touche Ross and Co. v. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC) 96,415
(S.D.N.Y., 1978); Altman v. Knight, 431 F.Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y., 1977); Fox v. Kane-Miller
Corp., 398 F.Supp. 609 (D. Md., 1975); Crowell v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Com-
pany, 373 F.Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa., 1974); Stewart v. Bennett, 362 F.Supp. 605 (D. Mass.,
1973).
The Code was accorded the greatest weight in the following decisions cited above: 544 F.2d
1126 (2d Cir. 1976), 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975), and 510
F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974).
In addition, the authors would like to call the reader's attention to two decisions that were
rendered in the early part of 1980: Chiarella v. United States [Current] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,309 (U.S. S.Ct., Mar. 18, 1980) and Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn [Current] Fed.
Sec. L Rep. (CC) 97,357 (2d Cir., April 21, 1980).
[121 POD, Introduction, at xv.
[131 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1976).
[14] 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1976).
(151 POD, § 402(a).
[16] POD, §§ 403,502(a).
[17] POD, § 404.
[18] POD, § 502(c)(1).
[19] "Distribution" means an offering other than (1) a limited offering or (2) an offering by
means of one or more trading transactions. POD § 242. The section also sets forth the condi-
tions of a "limited offering" and a "trading transaction".
[20] POD, § 299.16.
[21] POD, § 504(b).
[22] 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976).
[23] POD, § 242(b).
[241 POD, § 503(b).
[25] 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976) and Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1979).
[26] POD, § 514. Considerable thought was given to repealing the intrastate offering
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exemption, but in large part as a political matter, the exemption in modified form was retained
in the Code. See Bartell, Federal-State Relations under the Federal Securities Code, 32 Vand. L.
Rev. 457 (1979).
[27] POD, pt. III and § 512.
[28] POD, § 303.
[29] POD, § 512(e). The Commission has the authority to reduce the dollar amount of the
exemption to not less than $ 50,000 in any twelve month period or to impose conditions upon
or withdraw the exemption when the offering exceeds $ 50,000.
[30] Technically this approach of the 1933 Act results from the interaction of the exemp-
tions contained in sections 4(1) and 4(4) of the 1933 Act and the definition of underwriter con-
tained in Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. See Cheek, Exemptions Under the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 355 (1977) at 371-373.
[31] POD, § 242(c).
[32] Rule 144,17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1979).
[33] POD, § 512(d).
[34] POD, § 510.
[35] POD, § 502(b).
(36] POD, pt. XVI.
[37] POD, pt. XVII.
[38] POD, § 262.
[39] POD, § 1602(b).
[40] POD, § 1603.
[41] POD, §§ 1606-1610.
[42] POD, § 1722.
[43] POD, § 1708(c).
[44] POD, § 1704.
[45] See 55 ALI Proceedings 347-379 (1978).
[46] See generally Bartell, supra n. 26.
[47 ] For a critique of the Code's provisions relating to investment advisers, see Brown, Prin-
cipal Changes Which Would Be Effected Under the Proposed Federal Securities Code in the
Federal Regulation of Investment Advisers, 34 Bus. Law. 395 (Nov. 1978).
[48] 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (1976).
[49] 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1976).
[50] 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1976).
[51] POD, § 1305; see Stark, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in the Proposed Federal
Securities Code, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 527 (1979).
[52] POD, § 281.
[53] See Hawes, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1.935 - Fossil or Foil., 30 Vand.
L. Rev. 605 (1977).
[54] For a detailed examination of the Code's provision relating to administration and
enforcement, see Mathews, ALI Proposed Federal Securities Code: Part XV - Administration
and Enforcement, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 465 (1977).
[55] For a thorough analysis of the extraterritorial aspect of the Code, see Loss, Extraterri-
toriality in the Federal Securities Code, 20 Harv. Int'l L.J. 305 (1979). For a criticism of the
Code's approach in this area, see Karmel, The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securi-
ties Code, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 669 (1975); but see Curtis, The Extraterritorial Application of the
Federal Securities Code: A Further Analysis, 9 Conn. L. Rev. 67 (1976), for a reply to former
SEC Commissioner Karmel by one of Professor Loss's students.
[56] See 1934 Act, Section 30(b) and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
[57] POD, § 1905.
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[581 POD, § 1905(a)(1).
[59] POD, § 1905(a)(1)(A).
[60] POD, § 1905(a)(1)(B).
[61] POD, § 1905(b)(2).
[62] POD, § 1905(a)(1)(D).
[631 POD, §§ 1905(a)(2) and 1905(b)(1).
[64] POD, § 1905(c). For a general discussion of the Commission's broad rulemaking
power under the Code, see Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, supra n. 8.
[65] For a discussion of that case law by a present SEC Commissioner, see Loomis, Jr. and
Grant, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Institutions Outside the U.S.
and Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 1 J. Comp. Corp. L. & Sec. Reg.
39 (1978).
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